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STACKING APPELLATE DISSENTS:
DUE PROCESS IN THE APPELLATE ARENA
A defendant is convicted of a major crime after trial by jury.
The defendant appeals his conviction, raising two specifications of er-
ror on appeal.' First, he alleges that the trial court failed to use the
correct procedure in determining his competency to stand trial. Sec-
ond, he alleges that the trial court erroneously admitted a confession
obtained by the police without a valid waiver of his Miranda2 rights.
On appeal to a five-justice state supreme court, one justice agrees
that the competency procedure used by the trial court was incorrect.
Two other justices decide that the admission of the confession by the
trial court was erroneous. The appellate court is thus faced with the
following situation: three of five justices agree that there has been
a reversible error during the course of the trial, but the justices do
not agree on which error. Therefore, the court's vote is four to one
for affirmance on the competency issue, and three to two for affir-
mance on the confession issue. Two possible results may follow. The
case may be reversed by virtue of the fact that three of five justices
found error in the trial. Or, the verdict may be affirmed by virtue
of the court's inability to agree on one specific error. The Indiana
Supreme Court was faced with this very problem in 1982. However,
the Court either failed to recognize the existence of a problem, or
chose to ignore the issue, as there was no mention of it in the deci-
sion which affirmed the conviction.3 The issue of a divided appellate
court and the questions arising from it will be dealt with here.
Initially, it is important to understand the nature of the appellate
process. Therefore, the purpose and functions of appellate courts will
be explored first.4 Next the evolution of the appellate process will
1. In some jurisdictions, the specification of errors is a mandatory procedural
step prior to appeal. See, e.g., Ind. T.R. 59 (Burns Repl. 1983). Whether this procedure
is mandated or not, every jurisdiction requires the specification of errors in the ap-
pellate brief. See generally L. ORFIELD. CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA, 98-99 (1939).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Bryan v. State, __ Ind. _, 438 N.E.2d 709, (1982). The Indiana Supreme
Court split as follows:
Prentice Hunter Debruler Given Pivarnik
Competency Error No Error No Error No Error No Error
Confession No Error Error Error No Error No Error
4. See infra notes 7-59 and accompanying text.
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be traced, emphasizing the rights of the litigants within the process.5
Finally, two resolutions to the dilemma will be presented, both of
which can be reasonably justified in the abstract, but only one of which
can be condoned by the American Criminal Justice System.' The cor-
rect resolution stems from the unique concept of "justice" or "equity"
found in the American system, rooted both in history and
jurisprudence. Based upon such principles and considerations discussed
herein, the correct resolution is to reverse the judgment, and remand
the case for a new trial.
I. THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTIONS OF A REVIEWING COURT
Though not required to by the United States Constitution,7 every
state has provided some type of review from adverse rulings at the
trial-court level. This is most noticeable in the criminal justice systems,
reflecting the value placed on personal liberty found in the American
system.' Some states provide appeal from criminal convictions by
Constitution,9 while others guarantee appellate review by statute."
In either case, the appellate process has, and consequently appellate
courts have, a very definite purpose and exercise very basic functions.
It is vital to recognize the ultimate purpose of appellate review,"
and to keep this in mind throughout this inquiry. The ultimate pur-
pose of an appeal is to insure that justice is done to the appellant."
Again, this is particularly true in the criminal setting. As was ex-
plained by Professor Lester Orfield, a noted commentator on the ap-
pellate process, "to lose sight of this purpose is to commit the original
5. See infra notes 60-99 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 100-165 and accompanying text.
7. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("A review by an appellate
court . . . is not a necessary element of due process of law.")
8. For this reason, the scope of this note will be limited to appeals from
criminal convictions. Rationale from civil cases may be used, however, as a comparison
of the different concerns at stake. See infra note 107.
9. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. 1970, Art. VI, S 6.
10. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. S 35-38-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1983).
11. Very often in this section, the term "appellate review" is used as
synonomous with "appellate courts." In the context of the purpose and functions for
appellate procedure, they are for all practical purposes interchangeable.
12. L. ORFIELD, supra note 1. See also Commercial National Bank v. Parsons, 144
F.2d 231, 240 (5th Cir. 1944) (ruling that appellate courts sit "to do justice between
the parties, not merely to decide points in a tilt between lawyers"), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 796 (1945; Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are They Useful In the Administration of Justice?
56 GEo. L.J. 417, 419 (1968) ("An unfair or unjust judgment below is error, and the ob-
ject of the appellate procedure becomes that of correcting unfairness and of doing
practical justice between the parties.").
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sin of judicial procedure . . . the substitution of the actual ends of
judicature for the ends of justice." 3 Stating that the purpose of an
appellate court is to do justice may seem axiomatic. However, this
goal may be overlooked when one attempts to analyze the appellate
system as an institution in itself" rather than simply a part of the
overall process of criminal justice in America. Accepting justice as
the ultimate goal of the criminal justice system is crucial to this
inquiry.15 Once it is accepted, it may be used as a reference point
in discussing the specific appellate functions which seek to serve this
goal.
A. The Error Correction Function
The first function of appellate courts is to review for errors made
by the trial or lower court."6 If errors are found, they should be cor-
rected so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice.'7 This function may
be termed "Error Correction." In exercising Error Correction, the ap-
pellate court will determine whether the trial court correctly inter-
preted the record and the facts, and whether the court applied rele-
vant law to those facts. 8
Error Correction produces several results. First, litigants are pro-
tected against misuse of power by the trial courts. 9 With appellate
13. L. ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 33 (citing BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PRO-
CEDURE, C. 19).
14. See, e.g., Hufstedler, Constitutional Revision and Appellate Court
Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. REV. 577, 587 (1969) (Appellate courts exist to formulate policy
and precedents, to assure uniformity in the administration of justice, to provide ex-
ecutive direction to trial courts, and only incidentally to see that justice is done in
any particular case.)
15. As is evident by note 14, supra, accepting justice as the ultimate goal
is not always easy to do.
16. JUSTICE IN THE STATES: ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON THE JUDICIARY. 102 (March 11-14, 1971) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE IN THE
STATES].
17. Id. The one exception to this rule is the doctrine of harmless error.
However, for an appellate court to find error harmless, it must find it harmless "beyond
a reasonable doubt." See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966). See also
infra notes 100-165 and accompanying text. This stricter standard is presumably due
to the fact that the errors will not be corrected.
18. Note, An Intermediate Appellate Court-Does Utah Need One? 1979 UTAH
L. REV. 107, 108.
19. Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet the Changing Needs of The Federal
Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 585 (1974). Misuse of power is not meant to
imply any bad faith on the part of the judges. To explain, the following maxim is
supplied: De fide et officio judicis non recipitur quaestio, sed de scietia, sive set error
juris, sive facti; ('The good faith and honesty of the judge are not to be questioned,
but his knowledge, whether it be in error of law or fact, may be.")
1983]
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review becoming the rule rather than the exception" trial judges are
more motivated to make a correct decision in the first instance, as
they are aware that their decisions will be closely scrutinized."1 By
supplying this motivation, the appellate court is serving the interests
of justice even before a case is actually appealed.22
Secondly, Error Correction enhances the dignity, authority and
acceptability of the trial.23 The dignity of the trial is enhanced if the
appellate court reviews for correctness and finds no error. The
litigants, and the public as well, thus are assured that a conviction
was not the result of an arbitrary decision made by a single judge."
If the appellate court does find an error, the normal procedure is to
return the case to the trial court level for a correction of the error,
which reinforces the dignity of the system by illustrating that the
American system is one which will not tolerate mistakes." The author-
ity of the trial court is enhanced by Error Correction, because the
motivation supplied for correct decision-making raises the public's con-
fidence that a correct decision will, in fact, be rendered by the trial
court.' Finally, the acceptability of the trial is enhanced through sheer
repetition. The review of the same issues by two separate courts
bestows greater certainty that an erroneous decision will not be
made.' This, in turn, subjectively impresses upon the appellant the
correctness of the decision. The litigant is therefore reassured that
the decision "bears the institutional imprimatur and approval of the
20. See generally Crampton, Federal Appellate Justice in 1973, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 571 (1974) (suggesting that the major problems of the appellate system are caused
by its accessibility to litigants.)
21. Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 585.
22. For this reason, one cannot measure the importance of the appellate pro-
cess merely by calculating the percentage of cases which are appealed. The "backward
reach" of an appellate court can only realistically be measured if one removes the pro-
cess entirely. Then we would discover how trial judges not subject to review would
behave.
23. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR AND M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976)
[hereinafter referred to as CARRINGTON.]
24. Though most actual criminal trials are jury trials, the judge often makes
critical determinations before trial, e.g. on motions to suppress evidence. See generally,
Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE AND J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23 (1981)
(hereinafter referred to as KAMISAR.)
25. Again, an exception to this may be the harmless error doctrine. See supra
note 17.
26. Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 585.
27. For a good discussion of the enhancement of certainty through repetition,
see Cover and Aleinikoff, Dialectic Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE
L.J. 1035, 1045-46 (1977).
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whole social order as represented by the legal system." 8 Error Cor-
rection, then, is a vital part of the appellate process. When the review
for errors is rigorously made, the interests of justice are served, as
the probabilities of an innocent person being subjected to punishment
are minimized.2
B. The Institutional Review Function
The second major function of appellate courts is "Institutional
Review."' In utilizing the Institutional Review function, the appellate
court is somewhat less concerned with the impact of its decisions on
particular litigants, and more concerned with safeguarding justice in
the long run for the benefit of all litigants." Through Institutional
Review, the appellate court is charged with the duty of maintaining
consistency in the decisions of the subordinate courts in its
jurisdiction.2 Consistency is maintained through the announcement,
clarification and harmonization of the decisions of the trial courts, as
well as conforming its own decisions with those previously made.3
In turn, this consistency leads to uniformity in the jurisdiction," which
assures an even-handed application of the substantive law and pro-
cedures to each litigant. 5 As long as the laws are uniform and con-
sistently applied, any deviation in their application becomes more ob-
vious. Error Correction, therefore, becomes less difficult, as the ap-
pellate court will be better able to notice and act on any errors
reflected by the record. Furthermore, when consistency of decisions
is maintained, fewer errors will occur in the lower courts. The reduc-
tion of errors leads inevitably to the facilitation of justice.
28. CARRINGTON, supra note 23, at 2.
29. As Professor Cover points out, however, the lessening probability of an
erroneous conviction entails a corresponding rise in the probability that there will
be an erroneous failure to convict. This increase is then justified as the mandate of
the United States Supreme Court, as shown by cases such as Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963). See Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 27.
30. CARRINGTON, supra note 23, at 2.
31. The courts must balance this concern with that served by Error Correc-
tion; that being justice in the individual case. For a fuller discussion of this issue,
see infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
32. Kurland, Jurisdiction In the Supreme Court: Time For A Change? 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 616, 618 (1974).
33. CARRINGTON, supra note 23, at 2.
34. Id.
35. L. ORFIELD. supra note 1, at 33. But see Wilner, supra note 12, at 426. ("The
often articulated claim that appeals tend to promote uniformity and even-handed justice
is not easily substantiated ....").
36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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C. The Lawmaking Function
A third major function of appellate review is lawmaking. 7 To
"make" the law, the appellate courts structure the evolution of the
common law through, and at times in spite of, the doctrine of stare
decisis.3 In spite of stare decisis, which requires the courts to stand
by precedent and not disturb settled points of law,' an appellate court
may act incrementally as a lawmaker. For example, while deciding
case B, the court may incidentally limit case A, which had been decided
earlier. The ruling of case B now becomes the law of the jurisdiction.
The limiting of case A may continue through cases C, D, and E, until
the rule in case A is no longer valid. Through this process, the ap-
pellate court can effectively change the law, and subsequently bind
the court in the future to follow the new law. Thus, the court can
change the law in spite of stare decisis, and at the same time legitimize
the new law through stare decisis. The appellate court, therefore, has
the power to enhance the development of the law, as well as to give
direction to the growth of the law,'0 simply by modifying previously
decided case law.
The appellate court may further act as lawmaker by giving
definitive interpretations to the constitution and statutes operating
in its jurisdiction." Through this interpretation process, the appellate
court is able to expand or limit laws which have been provided by
37. See CARRINGTON supra note 23, at 3.
38. Kurland, supra note 32. Though the lawmaking function is sometimes
grouped with that of institutional review, see, e.g., JUSTICE IN THE STATES, supra note
18, it is sufficiently distinguishable to warrant separate consideration.
39. The doctrine of stare decisis mandates that the court abide by, or adhere
to, cases previously decided. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979).
40. See M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 17 (1963). ("Precedent is com-
monly considered one of the basics of the common law. It was never quite a strait
jacket, as some laymen (and lawyers) have tended to think. American judges have
always assumed power to overrule an earlier case if they considered it egregiously
wrong. The power was seldom exercised in the past. Still, it was there, along with
the more important power to 'distinguish' an embarrasing precedent."); See also Neff
v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 388, 390-91 (1936).
41. Not all scholars agree that appellate courts should serve as lawmakers.
As Professor Orfield points out, years of judicial decisions "and the passage of com-
prehensive criminal codes covering the substantive or procedural law or both have
made this function one of much less importance ...." Orfield, The Right of Appeals
in Criminal Cases, 34 MICH. L. REV., 937, 938 (1936). However, though such a view is
ideally sound, in reality most appellate courts engage in lawmaking in one form or
another, and therefore it is discussed here. See, e.g., CARRINGTON, supra note 23, at
3. ("Today .. .it is widely understood that the judges who enunciate legal principles
are engaged in a creative activity which can have significant ... social consequences.")
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either the legislature or by the constitution. For example, the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[No State shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."'2 The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this clause to provide an accused the right to counsel,'3
and a right to confront witnesses against him," but has not inter-
preted the clause to mandate the right to an appeal.45 By such inter-
pretation, the appellate courts inform the lower courts, judges, lawyers
and citizens of the meaning of the law as written. This sets the stan-
dards of appropriate procedures and interpretations as well as defin-
ing proper conduct.' 6 Lawmaking, therefore, is one of the major func-
tions of an appellate court.
The Lawmaking function is consistent with Error Correction and
Institutional Review. Through appellate court opinions, lower courts
are instructed as to the present status of the law.' With this infor-
mation the lower courts may all apply the same rules to the cases
before them. Also, with this information the trial courts are less prone
to make erroneous rulings. Consequently, the ultimate purpose of ap-
pellate review, that of doing justice, is also served.
A note of warning is appropriate at this juncture as an appellate
court which becomes unduly preoccupied with any one of these func-
tions will necessarily do so to the neglect of the others. 8 For exam-
ple, if a court focuses too heavily on institutional review by using
the cases before it purely as vehicles to promote consistency and direc-
tion in the long run, the error correcting function may be overlooked.
Were this to happen, the ability to focus on the specific errors in
the case before the court would necessarily be de-emphasized, and
the practical justice between the parties would be sacrificed. 9 Fur-
42. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
43. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right is provided by the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution but made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
44. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
45. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). There are of course many
other examples of judicial rule-making in the fourteenth amendment context. See
generally B. SCHWARTZ. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1970).
46. CARRINGTON, supra note 23, at 2.
47. For a discussion of other benefits of written opinions, as well as the
detriments, see Note, Written Opinions In the Modern Legal System: Publish and Perish,
41 ALB. L. REV. 813 (1977).
48. CARRINGTON. supra note 23, at 3.
49. The only way to avoid this result is for the court to espouse a rule of
law or construction, and simply not apply it to the case before it by making the ap-
plication prospective only. See, e.g., Murdock v. Ward, 178 U.S. 139, 149 (1900) ("We
1983]
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thermore, if a court concentrates too much on lawmaking, by espous-
ing new rules or changing old rules, the function of institutional review
will suffer, as the law will be in a state of flux, and consistency of
decisions will be unattainable.' Once again, the interests of justice
will suffer as a result. Therefore, an appellate court must take great
care in striking the proper balance. Because an appellate court is
charged with specific functions, there is always a danger that it will
lose sight of the reason for it existence; the facilitation of justice.5 1
The functions of an appellate court should not be seen as ends in
themselves, but as the means of attaining the higher end of justice.
If a court fails to recognize that it is ultimately working to achieve
justice, the case before the court will tend to be viewed abstractly
and decided mechanically.52 In this situation, the purity of the law
would take precedence over the realities of the case.
Not everyone would agree that preferring purity of the law over
the realities of the case is necessarily bad. For example, the philosophy
of "rule ultilitarianism' ' theorizes that the greatest amount of good
will accrue to the greatest number of people by strict adherence to,
and general application of, rules of law. Rule utilitarianism recognizes
that the rules expounded may work a hardship for a few individuals,
but accepts it as the sacrifice which must be made for the general
welfare.' Applying this philosophy to appellate review, it can be seen
that each of the functions of appellate courts accomodate rule
utilitarianism to a certain extent. The Error Correction function will
determine whether the appropriate rule is consistently applied, and
appellate Lawmaking will ensure that the rules are sufficiently modern
and correctly interpreted for the greatest number of cases.
On the other hand, some believe that allowing the needs of the
think the practical injustice that might result from an affirmance of the judgment
may be avoided . . . by a reversal of the judgment .... ").
50. Wilner, supra note 12, at 427 ("[Elach time an appellate court overrules
a precedent, it necessarily dispels whatever uniformity may have existed.
51. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
52. Millar, The Reform of Criminal Pleading in Illinois, 8 J. AM. INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 337, 338 (1917-1918): "It is the attitude of record worship, the trial
of the record rather than the case . . . that is here in question." "Record worship,"
according to Roscoe Pound, is "an excessive regard for the formal record at the ex-
pense of the case, a strict scrutiny of that record for 'errors of law' at the expense
of scrutiny of the case to insure the consonance of the result to the demands of the
substantive law." R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 161 (1930).
53. For a good analysis of utilitarian ethics, see FRANKEN, ETHICS 29-46 (1963).
54. It was undoubtedly a rule utilitarianist that coined the phrase, "hard cases
should not make bad law."
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1983], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss1/4
STACKING APPELLATE DISSENTS
law to be placed on a higher plane than the needs of the actors within
the law is the ultimate injustice., These persons subscribe to the ethics
of "case utilitarianism."5 The philosophy of case utilitarianism sug-
gests that justice must be individualized, so that the result of any
case must necessarily depend upon the specific situation presented.
Rules which would cause injustice in a particular case, although ap-
plicable, should be disregarded. 5 Case utilitarianism charges that any
general rule which looks to the aggregate satisfaction of a group of
cases rather than at the individual cases themselves makes the fun-
damental mistake of being oblivious to the distinctions among cases.58
Applied to appellate review, case utilitarianism finds support not in
the functions, but in the purpose of appellate courts; that purpose be-
ing to ensure that justice is done. 9
As can be seen, appellate courts must deal with competing con-
cerns when deciding individual cases. The court must deal not only
with the issues presented, which represent the needs of the law, but
must also deal with the cases before it, representing the individuals
seeking justice within the system. In the vast majority of cases, both
interests are adequately protected. However, when it becomes clear
in a given situation that both interests cannot be protected, which
interest should take precedence? Should the purity of the system
outweigh the individual's personal interest? To achieve resolution of
this issue, it is necessary to explore the evolution of the appellate
system, emphasizing the individual's place within it.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ON APPEAL
As previously noted, all states now provide some form of ap-
pellate review to convicted defendants, 0 although not required to do
so by the United States Constitution.' In most of these states, ap-
pellate review is granted to defendants as a matter of right and is
provided by statute.2 Since access to the appellate courts is provided
55. See generally Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164, 190 (1958).
56. Case utilitarianism is a variation of the concept described by Franken
as 'act utilitarianism'. See FRANKEN. supra note 53.
57. It is from the case utilitarian ethic that the defense of mistake in a criminal
trial was fostered.
58. See generally Sartorius, Dworkin On Rights and Utilitarianism, 1981 UTAH
L. REV. 263.
59. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
60. This fact was recognized in the plurality opinion of Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1955).
61. See supra note 7.
62. See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. S 35-38-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1983).
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to individuals by the various systems, it is important to examine the
rights of the individuals within the appellate system. This section,
therefore, will examine the evolution of the rights of appellate litigants.
The vast majority of criminal actions are local in nature.
The individual states have therefore, been more progressive in pro-
viding for criminal appeals than has the United States federal system.'
For example, in California, appellate review was guaranteed to any person
convicted of a felony as early as 1872.64 Today, California provides
the right to appeal any criminal conviction. 5 In that state, it is
recognized that "the right to appeal is guaranteed by law to every
convicted person; it is one of the most important rights possessed
by a convicted defendant, and every legitimate element should be ex-
ercised in its favor."66 Though not all states have the certitude of
California in this area, it is reasonable to conclude that all states now
recognize the importance of appellate review to ensure correctness
in the adjudication of guilt or innocence.6 7 Nevertheless, the United
States Supreme Court has remained firm throughout the years in its
judgment that appellate review of criminal convictions is not a
necessary element of due process of law.6 8 However, the Court has
also recognized as early as 1915 that once an appeal is provided for
by the state, and the criminal defendant has exercised his right of
review, the proceedings in the appellate tribunal are to be regarded
as part of the process of law of that state.69 Appellate proceedings
therefore are to be considered in determining any question concern-
ing the deprivation of life or liberty without the due process of law
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.76 This ruling suggests that
the imposition of certain safeguards on the appellate process itself
is not an unprecedented notion.
The most noted instances where the United States Supreme
Court has imposed fourteenth amendment standards of due process
63. For a good discussion of criminal appeals in the federal system, see OR-
FIELD, supra note 1, at 243-58.
64. CAL. PENAL CODE S 1235 (1872).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE S 1235 (1982).
66. People v. Serrato, 47 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1965).
67. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1955) (Plurality opinion of Justice Black)
("All states now provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions, recognizing
the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication of guilt or innocence.").
68. See e.g., McKane, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
69. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915).
70. Id. See also Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 151 (1957) (suggesting that a finding that the appellate process itself may offend
constitutional standards is not a novel concept).
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and equal protection on the state appellate system are in Griffin v.
Illinois7' and in Douglas v. California.7 ' In Griffin, the Court was faced
with a state appellate scheme that required convicted defendants to
furnish the appellate court with a bill of exceptions or report of the
proceedings at trial as a prerequisite to complete review.73 In many
cases, however, it was impossible to prepare such documents without
a transcript of the trial proceedings. Illinois law provided that indigent
prisoners who alleged Constitutional errors in their trial could obtain
a free transcript, but those who alleged other trial errors were re-
quired to pay for a transcript regardless of their financial status."
The petitioners in Griffin alleged that they were indigent and unable
to pay for a transcript, and were therefore precluded from exercising
their right to appeal under Illinois law."5 Although the petitioners could
not point to any Constitutional error in their trial, they alleged that
the Illinois appellate scheme itself was violative of the fourteenth
amendment." The United States Supreme Court agreed.7 In reaching
this result, the plurality opinion took notice of the fact that appellate
review had become an integral part of the state system for ad-
judicating guilt or innocence, and that a substantial proportion of
criminal convictions were reversed by state appellate courts." A denial
of adequate review to the poor would therefore cause many to lose
their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions." Though
the Court again admitted that appellate review is not Constitution-
ally mandated, it established that once review is provided, "the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses [of the fourteenth amendment]
protect persons ... from invidious discriminations."" Thus, the Court
made it clear that the appellate system is not immune from procedural
scrutiny.
In Douglas v. California,' the Court was faced with an appellate
71. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
72. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
73. The Illinois statute which established these requirements was ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110 S 259.70A (1953).
74. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 15. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, SS 826-832 (1955)
(Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act).
75. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13.
76. Id. at 15-16.
77. Id. at 20. The decision was 5-4. Mr. Justice Black authored the plurality
opinion, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter specially concurred. Two separate dissenting opin-
ions were filed.
78. Id. at 18-19.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
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scheme which provided that the state appellate courts, upon an in-
digent's request for counsel, could make an independent investigation
of the record to determine whether it would be advantageous to the
defendant, or helpful to the appellate court to order counsel appointed.
The petitioners in Douglas requested assistance of counsel for their
appeal, and the California District Court of Appeals denied the
request. 2 The United States Supreme Court reversed the denial, rul-
ing that "denial of counsel on appeal [to an indigent] would seem to
be a discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin
.... "" The Court therefore held that fair procedure mandates the right
to counsel when pursuing an appeal,' and thereby reaffirmed the no-
tion that appellate courts must comply with fourteenth amendment
standards.
Since the Griffin and Douglas decisions the United States
Supreme Court has extended the principle of due process to other
aspects of the criminal justice system," including most phases of post-
conviction relief.86 Additionally, the due process principle has been
applied to traditionally non-criminal proceedings where a deprivation
of physical liberty is at stake, such as juvenile proceedings.87 Due pro-
cess and equal protection safeguards therefore are applicable beyond
the traditional criminal trial. Recently, the courts have construed G-rif-
fin and its progeny to stand for the proposition that the due process
clause is applicable to appellate review with "the same vigor" as it
applies to criminal trials,8 and the states have accepted this
proposition." It follows, then, that the appellate courts must meet the
due process standard of "fundamental fairness" which is required in
all other steps of the proceedings.
82. Id. at 354.
83. Id. at 355.
84. Id. at 354.
85. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969). (preliminary hearing);
United States v. Wade, 38 U.S. 218 (1967) (pre-trial line-up).
86. See e.g., Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1957).
87. McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (due process clause requires
"fundamental fairness" in any juvenile proceeding).
88. See, e.g., Reauark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980) (ruling that
a delay in transcript preparation for appeal may constitute a denial of due process);
Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942, 950 (7th Cir. 1972) (ruling that the state is constitutional-
ly required to protect a petitioner's right to appeal over a critical mistake from court-
appointed counsel allowing deadline for appeal to lapse; Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp.
943, 948 (N.D. Texas 1978) (ruling that any substantial delay in the processing of ap-
peals may be a denial of due process).
89. See, e.g., Gallagher v. State, - Ind. - 410 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (1982);
Palmer v. Superior Court, 114 Ariz. 279, 560 P.2d 797 (1977).
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The term "fairness," when discussed in a due process context,
has historically been an extremely problematic concept. This is
presumably due to the inherent ambiguities and differing normative
connotations presented by the term "fair." In the procedural sense,
"fairness" is often linked to adequate notice and the opportunity to
be heard,9" representation by counsel,9 as well as other selective
safeguards protected by the Constitution. Griffin and its progeny have
undoubtedly imposed this standard of fairness on the appellate courts.2
There is, however a different use of the word "fair" that is of primary
concern here. It is this concept of fairness that has troubled legal
philosophers for years, as it has no clear definition. Scholars have
attempted to label this aspect of fairness with such terms as "substan-
tive due process,"93 or the "immutable principle of justice."9" Because
these labels are themselves problematic, however, they are inap-
propriate for use in this discussion. Therefore, for present purposes,
the concept of fairness in the normative context presented herein will
be referred to as "equity."9
Equity, as used here, may be described as "that fundamental
fairness essential to the concept of justice."' It is undoubtedly "equity"
that Professor Orfield was referring to when he wrote that "justice"
is the ultimate purpose of a criminal appeal.97 As Orfield observed,
"an innocent defendant must be released. A defendant who did not
secure a fair trial should have another trial."9 As defined, equity is
implicitly recognized in the concept of due process of law. It is unclear,
however, whether equity is one of the notions that the United States
Supreme Court was referring to when it applied the due process clause
to the area of appellate review.99 For this reason, resolution of the
legal problem confronted herein must be achieved on two different
90. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
91. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
92. See supra note 88.
93. See generally Lupu, Untangling The Strands Of The Fourteenth Amendment,
77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1978).
94. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 (1947) (Justice Frankfurter,
concurring).
95. It may well be argued that the term "equity" elicits as many inappropriate
connotations as the terms already discarded. Therefore, an alternative label of "Phred"
is now given to the concept described. Any person uncomfortable with the term "equity"
is invited to make the substitution freely.
96. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236 (1941).
97. L. ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 32. See also supra note 12.
98. L. ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 33.
99. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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planes-one which encompasses only acknowledged due process rights
in criminal appeals; and a second which incorporates the notion of
equity into the analysis. The incorporation of an equitable ethic into
the appellate process may be seen as the next step in the progressive
evolution of the protection of rights of litigants through the appellate
system.
III. RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
Recall the particular factual situation presented earlier:" A
defendant is convicted of a major crime. Exercising his right to ap-
peal, he alleges two distinct errors. First, he alleges that the pro-
cedure followed by the trial court in determining his competency to
stand trial was improper. Second, he alleges that his confession, which
was admitted into evidence by the trial court, was improperly ob-
tained, and therefore should have been suppressed. Either one of these
errors if accepted by the appellate court would result in a reversal
of the conviction. On appeal to a five-member supreme court, three
justices rule that the trial court did in fact commit an error. However,
the justices cannot agree upon which particular error the verdict
should be reversed. Only one justice agrees that there was error in
the competency determination, while two others conclude that the ad-
mission of the confession is erroneous. The remaining two justices
find no error. 1"' What is the result? Viewed from one perspective, a
majority of the court ruled that the trial court was correct in its deci-
sion on both counts. Resolution of this problem may vary depending
on what standard of due process is imposed on the appellate court.
Therefore, alternative resolutions to the problem will be examined;
one with and one without the concept of "equity" imposed on the court.
Furthermore, in reaching each conclusion, the functions and purpose
of appellate review"'o will be interposed to determine which will be
served by each resolution.
A. Resolution Under The "Procedure Only" Standard
Under the first standard, that of applying purely procedural
safeguards, the logical resolution of this problem is to affirm the con-
viction. All that is required under the Griffin and Douglas analyses
is that once an opportunity to appeal has been given, it cannot be
100. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
101. See Bryan v. State, - Ind. -, 438 N.E.2d 709 (1981). See also supra,
note 3.
102. See supra notes 7-59 and accompanying text.
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denied arbitrarily or discriminately, and indigents cannot be treated
differently because of their lack of funds. The petitioner in this situa-
tion will have the right to present his claim through counsel to a
higher authority, and his right will be fulfilled when the court reviews
the issues. If a majority of the court finds neither issue to be
meritorious, his conviction will be sustained. Therefore, his right to
appeal will have been afforded and the trial court's verdict sanctioned.
Such a result, on its face, appears to serve the functions of the
appellate process. The first function, Error Correction, is fulfilled when
the appellate court reviews the issues raised. Since a majority of the
appellate court found that neither issue constituted reversible error,
the trial judge is deemed correct on both counts. Therefore, there
is no error to be corrected. Institutional Review, the appellate court's
second function, is also served by the decision to affirm. In holding
that the trial court's action on both issues was appropriate, the ap-
pellate court is ruling that the action was not inconsistent with the
law of the jurisdiction, as previously adjudged by the appellate court.
Therefore, uniformity of decisions is maintained. Furthermore, the trial
court is reassured that its rulings were in line with the legal struc-
ture. Since the appellate courts are charged with the duty of chang-
ing laws that are inconsistent with society,0 3 the fact that the rulings
in question were deemed correct indicates that the rulings were not
inconsistent with the legal structure.
There is strong logic in affirmance, and this logic springs from
the consequences of a reversal. For example, if a majority of the court
does not agree on one specific ground for reversal, but the case is
reversed nonetheless, and remanded back to the trial court for a new
trial, the trial court might' 4 have to rule the same way on each issue
should it arise again.0 5 If the trial judge were to reverse his decision
on either of the issues raised again at trial, this new decision may
be contrary to the law as agreed upon by a majority of the appellate
court."e On the other hand, if the same issues arise and the trial judge
makes the same rulings as in the original trial, the defendant could
simply appeal the rulings again. Unless there has been a change in
the personnel of the appellate court (and possibly even if there has
been such a change), the identical problem will surface, and the ap-
103. See supra note 40.
104. There are at least three different possibilities of what will happen with
these same issues once the case is remanded. See infra text accompanying notes 149-154.
105. Likewise, it is not always assured that the same issues will arise again.
See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 104 and infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
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pellate court would be forced to make the same decision." 7 "Such would
be the strange and anomalous attitude of the case ad infinitum, as
often as it should be tried below and [appealed again] under the same
set of facts."1"8 Therefore, in order to give finality to the judgment,
it is argued that an affirmance is in order.
To resolve this problem with an affirmance would be consistent
with the rule utilitarianist philosophy."' The laws or rules in ques-
tion are kept pure, and the applications of the rules are kept general.
Since it is determined that the rules were not erroneously applied,
it follows that the decision must be affirmed. The greatest number
of persons are said to benefit' from this approach, as the law can be
applied even-handedly and with no exceptions. A code of conduct is
thereby prescribed to the trial courts. The appellate system itself is
made a product of the law, questioning only whether a specific situa-
tion falls within its boundaries, or outside its parameters. Consistency
is maintained, and therefore justice is served. The litigant is seem-
ingly assured that the decision "bears the institutional imprimatur
and approval of the whole social order as represented by the legal
system."'10 The logic of this analysis has been termed "unanswerable.""
However, analysis of the problem using the "equity" standard may pro-
vide a response to the "unanswerable."
B. Resolution Under the Equity Standard
Since the ultimate purpose of the criminal justice system, and
107. For a good discussion of this line of reasoning, see In Re McNaughton's
Will, 138 Wis. 179, 118 N.W. 997, on reh'g, 120 N.W. 288 (1908). In McNaughton, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin was divided over two issues; one dealing with undue
influence in the making of a will, and the other questioning the weight of the evidence.
The Court split as follows:
Siebecker Barnes Kerwin Timlin Start Dodge Marshall
Preponder- No No No No
ance of Error Error Error Error Error Error Error
Undue No No No No
Influence Error Error Error Error Error Error Error
As can be seen, four of the seven justices found error in the trial, yet on each specifica-
tion of error it was adjudged that the trial court made a correct ruling. The Court
affirmed the judgment.
108. Browning v. State, 33 Miss. 47, 89 (1856) (Handy, J., dissenting).
109. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
110. See CARRINGTON, supra note 23, at 2.
111. McNaughton, 120 N.W. at 290. See also supra note 107.
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hence an appellate court,"2 is to do justice, an unjust result must not
be tolerated. The court, in reaching the result of affirming the con-
viction, despite a majority finding prejudicial error in the criminal
trial, has committed the "original sin of judicial procedure." ' a The court
has substituted "the actual ends of judicature for the ends of justice.' 1 .
When the majority of an appellate court finds that a person has not
had a fair trial, he is certainly entitled to another trial."5 Without
this, he cannot be assured that the result " bears the institutional
imprimatur and approval of the whole social order as represented by
the legal system.""' These statements do little to disturb the logic
for affirmance, for the logic is sound. However, these statements are
not based on logic, they are based primarily on the concept of
"equity..."7 Therefore, a re-evaluation of the problem presented is
necessary; a re-evaluation based on due process which imposes the
element of equity on the appellate decision-makers.
When the majority of an appellate court finds fundamental er-
ror in a criminal trial, it is only fair that a new trial be given. This
result would serve the ultimate purpose of the appellate court, to in-
sure that justice is done."' Justice demands that those found guilty
be punished, and those found innocent be freed. In America, guilt or
innocence can be legally adjudged only after an accused has had the
benefit of a fair trial. If a trial is deemed unfair it must not be
tolerated by the American system. In fact, a number of courts"9 have
refused to tolerate the notion of an unfair trial, even though faced
with the identical problem posed here.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi was confronted with the prob-
lem of a divided appellate court in 1856, in the case of Browning v.
State." In Brouming, the defendant had been convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. He sought appeal of two issues. 2 ' Although two
members found error, the three member supreme court could not
112. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
113. L. ORFIELD. supra note 1, at 33 (citing J. BENTHAM. PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE, C. 29).
114. Id.
115. State v. LeDuc, 89 Mont. 545, 559, 300 P. 919, 933 (1931).
116. See CARRINGTON, supra note 23, at 2.
117. See supra notes 60-99 and accompanying text.
118. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 1.
119. See infra notes 120-139 and accompanying text.
120. 33 Miss. 47 (1856).
121. The first issue was whether the verdict was supported by the evidence,
and the second was whether there had been juror misconduct.
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agree on either issue,' so the court affirmed the conviction. However,
the court recognized the problem that its disunity had created, and
granted a rehearing." Realizing that the defendant's life was at stake
in its decision, the court reversed its position.24 Justice Fisher, writing
for the court, explained that although there was no agreement on a
specific issue, there was agreement that the trial court "erred in pro-
nouncing the judgment of death upon the prisoner, upon a verdict
which [two of us] say was manifestly wrong.'n The court then assigned
as error the fact that the trial judge failed to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial.26 The judgment was therefore reversed and
the case remanded."
The Supreme Court of Montana was faced with an identical prob-
lem in State v. LeDuc."2' In LeDuc, the defendant had been convicted
of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison." Again, three of five members of the court found error, but
the three were divided over which allegation was actual error. 30 In
122. The Court split as follows:
Fisher Smith Handy
Sufficiency of No No
Evidence Error Error Error
Conduct of No No
Jury Error Error Error
123. Browning, 33 Miss. at 84.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 87.
126. Id.
127. Id. In 1857, John Browning's re-trial for murder ended up in a mistrial.
In 1858, he was again tried and acquitted. Id. at 92.
128. 89 Mont. 545, 300 P. 919 (1931).
129. 89 Mont. at 547, 300 P. at 920-21.
130. The Court split as follows:
Angstman Galen Callaway Matthews Ford
Admission of No No No
Dying Declaration Error Error Error Error Error
Jury Instruction No No No No
Error Error Error Error Error
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LeDuc, as in Browning, the court initially affirmed the conviction,"3 '
and later reversed itself on rehearing.'32 The court recognized that
the situation presented a legal tangle,'" but also ruled that the resolu-
tion would have to be in favor of the defendant. The real issue, ac-
cording to the court, disregarding any legal phraseology, was "Did
the defendant have a fair trial?"'" The court then ruled that since
three of the justices found that the defendant did not have a fair trial,
and "the law of the land guarantees to every man a fair trial,"'
35
the conviction must be reversed. Furthermore, the court character-
ized the assignment of specific errors as a "mere procedural
requirement,"'" and a "hypertechnicality" with a "tendency to subvert
justice."'' 7 In opting for reversal, the court reasoned that while the
rationale of the McNaughton case,'38 which warned of repetition of trial
and appeal, is a possibility, a court of justice cannot very well con-
demn a man to twenty-five years in prison because of the fear of a
possibility. 13
9
The reasoning and results of the Browning and LeDuc cases coin-
cide with the philosophy of case utilitarianism," and may satisfy the
rule utilitarianism ethic as well.' Under the case utilitarianist view,
the appellate court is required to view the case as a whole rather
than just reviewing the assigned issues. While the errors individually
did not call for a new trial, collectively the errors rendered the trial
unfair, and therefore unacceptable in the American system of justice.
131. 89 Mont. at 554, 300 P. at 928. (citing McNaughton, 120 N.W. 288 (1908),
as authority for affirmance). See supra note 107.
132. 89 Mont. at 559, 300 P. at 932-34. It is interesting to note here that the
decision to reverse the conviction was on a three-two vote with Justice Angstman,
who found error in the trial, voting to affirm, while Justice Matthews, who found
no error in the trial, voting to reverse. See supra note 130.
133 This fact is noted here because in a number of cases involving the prob-
lem at hand, the court does not recognize in its opinion that the problem is before
it. See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 438 N.E.2d 709 (1982) (affirming); Husband v. Salt Lake
City, 69 P.2d 491 (1937) (affirming); State v. Nadlman, 63 Idaho 153, 118 P.2d 58 (1941)
(reversing).




138. McNaughton, 138 Wis. 179, 118 N.W. 997; See supra note 107.
139. 89 Mont. at 560, 300 P. at 934. There are other cases reaching the same
result with analogous reasonings, but for present purposes, Browning and LeDuc will
suffice. See, e.g., Pollack v. Heinecke, 64 Ark. 180, 46 S.W. 185 (1898); Price v. State,
114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914).
140. See generally supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
141. See generally supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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This view also rejects the mechanical approach to appeals which may
develop in courts which simply review for error. The question of
whether the applicable legal formula has been satisfied enters into
the judgment, but will not preclude the further inquiry of whether,
on the whole, the defendant received a fair trial.""
The outcome may also satisfy the rule utilitarianist view. The
American criminal justice system has one major rule which takes
precedence over all others. That rule is that an accused shall have
a fair trial."' When the majority of an appellate court agrees that
the trial provided to a criminal defendant was not fair, the verdict
from that trial must not be allowed to stand lest the primary rule
of American justice be broken. Therefore, to reverse the conviction
in a case such as this would be consistent with the rule utilitarianist
ethic. The primary rule that all defendants should have a fair trial
is kept pure and, moreover, is applied even-handedly throughout the
system, regardless of the circumstances leading to the decision."
Furthermore, reversal of the verdict in such a situation ade-
quately serves the functions of the appellate process.4 5 Error Correc-
tion is facilitated even though the judgment is reversed as the ap-
pellate court will still search the record for errors in need of correc-
tion. When the court rules that no reversible error has been found,
it does not necessarily mean that the trial court's actions were en-
tirely correct. It means solely that any mistakes made by the trial
court did not reach reversible status.' 8 For example, in the factual
situation presented in the introduction, the first issue urged as error
was the procedure used to determine the defendant's competency to
stand trial. The defendant alleged that the law of the state required
the trial court to have the defendant examined by two psychiatrists
before the trial began."7 The trial judge, however, accepted the opin-
ions of only one psychiatrist and one psychologist.'48 Therefore,
although the court ruled that this action by the trial court did not
142. See generally Millar, supra note 52.
143. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) ("The failure to accord
an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.") See
also M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 40 at 133 ("No other field of law garnered as much con-
stitutional attention as criminal procedure. The basic rights of man turned out, in large
part, to be rights to fair criminal trial.")
144. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 7-59 and accompanying text.
146. This statement is not meant to imply that the trial court committed a
"harmless error," just that the court did not act entirely correctly.
147. See IND. CODE ANN. S 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns Repl. 1979).
148. See Bryan v. State, - Ind. -, 438 N.E.2d 709 (1982).
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constitute an abuse of the court's discretion, it is clear that the ac-
tion was not entirely correct. Were the case to be remanded, and
the trial court accept only the opinions of two psychiatrists, there
would be no doubt about the correctness of the procedure. Were the
defendant to be convicted again, and were he to appeal the judgment
again, the competency procedure could no longer be challenged.
Therefore, the possibility of endless re-trials and appeals on identical
issues would be foreclosed in this case. The appellate court would
have served its first function of Error Correction, and the court would
also be fulfilling its obligation to facilitate justice by giving the defen-
dant the benefit of the doubt in the fairness of his trial. This can
be seen as the first possibility of what can happen once a new trial
is granted.49
The errors alleged in Browning v. State"' exemplify the second
possibility of what can happen to these issues on remand, as well as
give another example of a case where Error Correction may be served
by a reversal. One of the errors alleged in Browning concerned the
conduct of a juror. 5' Were a new trial to be given, a new jury would
be impanelled. The odds are overwhelmingly against the same fac-
tual situation occurring with a new jury. Were the defendant con-
victed again,"' his appeal would not be identical to his previous ap-
peal. Therefore, it is not only possible that a ruling on one of the
alleged errors can legitimately be made either way within the trial
court's discretion, it is also possible that some conduct alleged as er-
ror will not reoccur at a second trial. Giving the defendant the benefit
of the doubt in these situations would not send the legal system into
arrears, as predicted."13
There are, of course, cases in which the errors disagreed upon
are assured to arise again, and could not reasonably be decided other-
wise in the trial court, based on the existing authority. For example,
two assignments of error could deal with the admissibility of evidence,
the first being a confession, and the second some physical evidence.
If a majority of the appellate court cannot agree on which admission
was erroneous, it is faced with a difficult situation. On remand, if the
law of the state mandated admission of both the confession and the
149. See supra note 104.
150. 33 Miss. 47 (1856). See supra notes 121 and 122.
151. See supra note 121.
152. See supra note 127.
153. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Handy in Browning v. State, 33 Miss.
47, 89 (1856). See also McNaughton, 120 N.W. 288, 291 (1908) (If the rule contended
for were to prevail, a jury case could never be terminated.)
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evidence, the trial court would have no discretion in the matter. On
appeal, the appellate court would split the same way on these two
issues. The only equitable solution in this instance is for the appellate
court to direct the trial court to reverse its decision on one of the
two issues, should they both come up again." The authority for such
a direction is found in the notions of "equity" and due process of law,
discussed earlier. Since the ultimate rule of the American judicial
system is to give a defendant a fair trial,155 the result reached here
is the only fair solution, as it is the only possibility of having a ma-
jority of the appellate court agree that the trial given was, in fact,
fair."'
This result would stem from an equitable view of the interests
involved. The state's interest in institutional purity, a system free
from consecutive trials and appeals is advanced by this result, as once
the trial court rules in favor of the defendant on one of the alleged
errors, the defendant would not be able to raise that issue on appeal.
Most importantly, though, the defcndant's interest in securing a fair
trial, as well as society's interest in providing a fair trial, would be
served by this result. Though there may be a competing interest in
the state's using all of its evidence gathered against the defendant,
this interest is clearly outweighed by the defendant's right to a fair
trial."7
The remaining functions of the appellate courts, Institutional
154. Though likely, there is no guarantee that the situation will, in fact, reoc-
cur. Any person familiar with the intricacies of a criminal trial and the unpredictabil-
ity of juries will attest that there is always a possibility of a mistrial, a hung jury
or an acquittal at the second trial. Therefore, the affirmation of the conviction here
would be based on the fear of a mere possibility that the situation would occur.
155. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
156. To some, such a result may seem too idealistic for the realities of the
criminal justice system. However, it would not be the first time that the ideals of
fairness in the system outweighed all other concerns. See, e.g., KAMISAR, supra note
24, at 1367, reporting on the Seale-Huggins case. It is noted that after screening some
1000 prospective jurors for the murder and kidnapping trial of Bobby Seale and Erika
Huggins, the trial ended up in a hung jury. Judge Mulvey of the Connecticut Superior
Court thereafter dismissed all charges against both defendants, concluding that an
unbiased jury, which is essential for a fair trial, could not be selected without "super-
human efforts;" efforts which none of the parties should be made to endure.
157. There are many other interests which outweigh that of the state's to put
forth all of the evidence gathered against a defendant. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence to protect the rights of persons against illegal
searches and seizures); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (excluding evidence
of post-indictment line-up done without the opportunity of having defendant's counsel
present).
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Review and Lawmaking, would suffer no adverse affects from an
equitable view of the problem presented. As for Institutional Review,
the written opinions of the appellate court on the issues themselves
will sufficiently inform those interested in the state of the law.1" Any
confusion resulting from the reversal of the judgment can be minimized
by the appellate court, simply by explaining what it is doing, and in-
structing the trial court accordingly. The written opinions of the court
would also sufficiently fulfill the appellate court's lawmaking duties.
If the case before the court is one of great consequence on a point
of law, the majority concurrence on this point would be just as valid
as if the conviction had been affirmed. If the case presents no such
issue of major legal significance, the points of law would remain
unscathed, as lawmaking would not even be implicated.
An equitable view of the interests would also be consistent with
the purpose of appellate review-that of doing justice between the
parties.159 The actual ends of judicature would not, in this situation,
be allowed to subvert the ends of justice.8 0 The appellate court will
look beyond the sterile record in which the issues are presented, and
recognize the defendant's interest in having a fair adjudication of guilt
or innocence.
The imposition of an equitable standard on appellate decision-
makers would not be a difficult task, nor would it be completely uni-
que. For example, in Chapman v. California,"0 ' the United States
Supreme Court held that before a constitutional error occuring in a
criminal trial may be deemed harmless by an appellate court, the ap-
pellate court must be able to declare the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."2 In reaching this decision, the Court reasoned that
although the appellate court does not ordinarily perform the task of
deciding issues on such a high standard, the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard "is a familiar standard to all courts ...""e Thus, to ensure
fairness, the appellate courts were charged with the duty of making
decisions on a higher level than was ordinarily done. The same ra-
tionale, stated in Chapman, is applicable to the imposition of equity
158. See Price v. State, 114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914) ("While the law of
the case is settled by the concurring view of the judges as expressed in this opinion
.. . the net result ... is that the judgment must be reversed.").
159. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 13.
161. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Chapman dealt with the issue whether a prosecutor's
comment to the jury on the defendant's refusal to testify should be deemed "harmless
error."
162. Id. at 24.
163. Id.
1983]
Hansen: Stacking Appellate Dissents: Due Process in the Appellate Arena
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
164 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.18
on the appellate courts. The standard of equity, in the context used
here, is one that is familiar to all courts. When the interests involved
in this case are weighed using an equity analysis, the result is a fair,
just solution to a legal tangle. To impose a standard of equity on the
appellate courts, then, is a logical step in the evolution of the appellate
system.
The mechanics of imposing an equity standard on appellate courts
would not be difficult. All that is necessary is to impose a require-
ment for a decision on the "case." To do this, the appellate court could
simply vote among the justices on the ultimate question: "Did the
defendant have a fair trial?" Implicit in this question is the query
of whether the result was just.lu Regardless of the reasoning used
to determine the conclusion, if a majority of the court responds in
the negative, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed.6
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic purpose of appellate review of criminal cases is to en-
sure that justice is done. To ensure justice, appellate courts exercise
three basic functions; Lawmaking, Institutional Review and Error Cor-
rection. Each function is exercised in a way to serve the interests
of justice.
The right to appeal a criminal conviction has never been deemed
a constitutional imperative. However, once an appeal is provided for,
the constitutional standard of due process applies to the appellate pro-
ceeding with the same vigor as in criminal trials. The notion of due
process of law encompasses a fundamental fairness standard which
may be termed "equity." Therefore, both the concepts of justice and
"equity" must be taken into account by appellate decision-makers.
When the majority of an appellate court agrees that there has
been a reversible error in a criminal trial, yet cannot agree on any
164. This requirement would undoubtedly bring serious criticism from persons
who would view this as simply the substitution of the judgment of the appellate court
for that of the trial court. However, there should be nothing inherently wrong with
such a substitution when the interests of justice are at stake.
165. This is analogous to the situation where the votes on a specific error come
from different lines of reasoning. For example, if a three-judge appellate court is faced
with the issue of the admissibility of a confession, one judge may believe that the
confession was obtained through coercion, yet a second judge may believe that the
confession was inadmissible because the defendant did not waive his Miranda rights.
The case will obviously be reversed because of the erroneous admission of the confes-
sion, and no one would question the decision, even though they disagreed on the reason
for inadmissibility.
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one error, two resolutions can be made, affirmance or reversal. The
concept of equity requires that before the court makes a final deter-
mination, it inquire as to whether, on the whole, the decision is just.
When seen in this fashion, a conviction should be reversed when a
majority of an appellate court determines that a criminal trial is not
free from prejudicial error. Such a result shifts the focus of the ap-
pellate court away from the sterility of the law to the realities of
the case. The appellate courts thus could become full participants in
the American scheme of justice.
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